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 Ethics and Contemporary American Literature:
 Revisiting the Controversy over John Gardner's
 On Moral Fiction
 Marilyn Edelstein
 Santa Clara University
 In 1978, the novelist John Gardner published a rather slender treatise
 called On Moral Fiction in which he claimed that true art must be moral,
 that little art being produced then was moral and, therefore, that most
 of his contemporaries were either bad artists or not artists at all.' It is
 difficult to recall a book about literature and/or ethics-at least one
 written by a novelist or poet rather than, say, by William Bennett-that
 has been received with so much hostility, especially among other
 writers and artists. Was the hostile response deserved, or is there,
 beneath the polemics and diatribes, anything worth listening to in
 Gardner's call for renewed attention to the ethical obligations and
 effects .of fiction or of literature more generally?
 The reactions to Gardner's book largely divided along ideological
 lines. Some conservatives and neo-conservatives appreciated his basic
 argument that art must be moral and that most contemporary literature
 and criticism were misguided, even if they found the book otherwise
 flawed (see, e.g., Epstein). Most critics and theorists on the left and most
 of the writers whose work he discussed in the book rejected his argu-
 ments with disdain. A special 1980 issue of Fiction International included
 28 mostly brief, mostly negative, and occasionally scathing responses
 to Gardner's book by such writers as John Barth, Raymond Federman,
 Gilbert Sorrentino, John Updike2 (although a few less well-known
 writers and critics did praise some aspects of the book). In Barth's own
 1980 essay, "The Literature of Replenishment," Barth calls On Moral
 Fiction a "tract . . . an exercise in literary kneecapping that lumps
 modernists and postmodernists together without distinction and con-
 signs us all to Hell with the indiscriminate fervor characteristic of late
 converts to the right" (66-67). Many reviewers and most of his peers
 responded as a group of parents would if their children's teacher had
 written a book called The Joys of Pedophilia. Robert Towers' review in
 the New York Review of Books was titled "Good Grief!"Although Towers
 does suggest we shouldn't dismiss On Moral Fiction altogether, he
 criticizes "the puritanical strain underlying Gardner's exhortations"
 and notes that Gardner "flings about the words 'moral' and 'immoral'
 shamelessly, evoking salvation and hell-fire" (31). Roger Sale's review
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 in the New York Times Book Review was called "Banging on the Table."3
 What provoked such strong reactions?
 Gardner's book is certainly in the same polemical tradition as
 Tolstoy's What Is Art?, written in 1897 after Tolstoy's religious conver-
 sion. Tolstoy, who Gardner discusses, argued that true art must unite
 all men in "sonship to God and. .. the brotherhood of man" (150, my
 emphases)--either through affirming these true Christian ideals or
 through sharing simple, honest human feelings. But Tolstoy was will-
 ing to take the consequences of his own theory--consigning his own
 books War and Peace and Anna Karenina to the category of bad art, while
 raising china dolls (and two lesser, didactic stories of his own) to the
 pedestal of good art. Gardner's book, on the other hand, was perceived
 by many as self-serving, a forum in which to criticize his peers and
 defend his own work (or at least what he wanted his work to be). Ronald
 Sukenick called On Moral Fiction "a sort of advertisement for himself
 [Gardner]" and thought the best response to the book was to ignore it
 ("A Writers' Forum," 21). But many "classic" works of literary criticism
 by practicing writers, such as Wordsworth's Preface to Lyrical Ballads or
 Eliot's "Tradition and the Individual Talent," can also be seen as
 primarily explanations, justifications, and/or defenses of the writers'
 own work.
 The hostile tone of many responses to Gardner's book can be ex-
 plained in at least three ways: 1) his contemporaries took great offense
 at being called immoral or amoral and thus bad writers; 2) many artists,
 writers, critics, and theorists, find discussions of morality and art quite
 uncomfortable; or 3) the book is weak, flawed, or stupid.4 While there
 may be some legitimacy to the third of these explanations, I would like
 to focus more on the first two, since I find Gardner's book flawed but
 provocative and parts of his argument worth serious attention.
 Recent debates about NEA and NEH funding, about public school
 curricula, about violence and, even worse, talk shows on television
 demonstrate clearly the dangers of judging art solely by rigid and
 narrowly defined notions of "the moral." But can one acknowledge the
 risks of evaluating literary and artistic works solely by their supposed
 moral effects without assuming that discussions of ethics and literature
 have no place in discourse, even postmodern discourse, today?
 Gardner is right that most critics and theorists, from Plato through
 the Romantics, have assumed that literature has-or should have-
 moral effects, even if they've disagreed about what those effects may
 be. In The Republic, Plato argued that poetry was morally corrupting,
 since it was thrice removed from the truth and fostered emotion rather
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 than reason. Horace assumed literature could and should teach as well
 as delight. In An Apology for Poetry, Sir Philip Sidney defended poetry
 against the charges that had been leveled against it by Plato and by
 Sidney's contemporary Stephen Gosson. Sidney argued that poetry was
 the best of all the arts and sciences for moving readers to virtuous action
 by sweetly revealing the path to it through blending philosophical
 precepts with vivid examples. Yet Sidney acknowledged that not all
 poets successfully moved and taught their readers.
 The idea that art should both instruct and delight persisted in most
 literary and aesthetic theory through at least the end of the eighteenth
 century. Gardner argues' that the current critical belief in separating the
 aesthetic from the moral is traceable to New Criticism, although he
 briefly mentions Kant in this regard. I think Kant was a pivotal figure
 in this development. In The Critique of Judgment, Kant argues that the
 judgment of beauty must be separated from the judgment of the good
 (and of the useful).5 Still, post-Kant, in the early nineteenth century,
 Romantic poet-critics like Shelley and Wordsworth would argue that
 poetry could have subtle moral effects through awakening imagination
 and empathy. But the moral and the aesthetic were severed almost
 completely with the rise of aestheticism in the later nineteenth century.6
 The foregrounding of the aesthetic or linguistic rather than the ethical
 dimensions of literature continued in Modernism and in the various
 twentieth-century formalisms (although contra Gardner, I would argue
 that New Critics still found "human themes" even in supposedly
 autonomous verbal icons). Structuralism certainly continued this em-
 phasis on form, structure, and language; some believe poststructural-
 ism led to even further evacuation of moral dimensions from literary
 theory and criticism.7 Criticism in the twentieth century has been much
 more interpretive and analytical than evaluative (except in the case of
 book reviews); when value has been an issue, it has been so more often
 in terms of aesthetics (and sometimes politics) than ethics. And it is
 evaluative criticism linking the aesthetic and the ethical which Gardner
 hopes to resuscitate (144-45).
 Published at the height of postmodernism in literature, the arts, and
 theory, On Moral Fiction could easily be seen as a reactionary text by a
 writer longing for return to an at least interrupted if not outmoded
 tradition. Gardner is, indeed, proud to claim he is taking "the tradi-
 tional view" that "true art is moral: it seeks to improve life, not debase
 it" (5). For Gardner, a literary work that is not "serious and beneficial"
 is not bad art-it is not art at all (6). He sees much of the work of his
 contemporaries, who he claims are often "nihilists, cynics, and
 merdistes," as tending toward destruction (6), whereas true art must be
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 "life-giving" (15). And certainly many of his contemporaries had radi-
 cally different ideas from Gardner's about the relation between ethics
 and aesthetics. Most postmodernists in the 1970's would have echoed
 Jerry Bumpus in saying "I don't want to improve people with my
 writing" ("A Writers' Forum," 129) and followed Vladimir Nabokov in
 asserting that their books were not didactic and contained no moral
 messages.8
 Gardner criticizes not only contemporary writers, primarily of fic-
 tion, but also the critics who support them, who chatter about
 "hermaneutics [sic]" rather than the human (129) or debate the defini-
 tion of postmodernism while the world goes to hell in a handbasket (7).
 Some recent movements in the arts (like conceptual art) and most
 contemporary literary theories "evade or suppress moral issues."
 Postmodernists, he asserts, "accidentally raise the issue of art's morality
 and take the wrong side" (55). But now John Gardner comes along,
 wielding Thor's hammer (the overarching metaphor of the book) to
 save the day, welcoming the moral back into the fold of critical and
 theoretical discourse. Since he believes that "Truth, Goodness, and
 Beauty are the fundamental concerns of art and therefore ought to be
 the fundamental concerns of criticism" (144), it is only fitting that they
 are his own preoccupations.9
 Although for Gardner true art is and must be moral, he does not
 believe it should be overtly didactic-and this is a major point of
 disagreement with Tolstoy. Gardner asserts that artists who set out
 with a "predetermined message" are doomed to failure (85). For him,
 "the morality of art is ... far less a matter of doctrine than of process"
 (91). This view seems similar to Shelley's in "A Defence of Poetry" that
 poetry with an explicit moral aim is unlikely to have the moral effect that
 can be achieved through its enlarging of the imagination and thus of
 the capacity for empathy (328). Art, for Gardner, must discover what it
 has to say rather than say what it has already discovered (14). For
 Gardner, propaganda masquerading as literature is just as morally
 reprehensible as is work that fails to engage seriously any moral issues.
 True art, for him, explores moral questions but doesn't preach explicit
 moral messages.
 Gardner argues that art can be moral in several ways: by holding up
 models of virtue and of decent behavior, by celebrating life's potential
 with a vision rooted in love (which, for him, Toni Morrison and John
 Irving do), by clarifying life, by humanizing its readers, by designing
 "visions worth trying to make fact" (100). Moral art must affirm life and
 reveal a path to a better possible future.
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 Many of us might be sympathetic to such general principles. It would
 be nice to have more truly life-affirming, even inspiring fiction, movies,
 television shows--even if we also want to maintain a place for work
 that mocks or rages against life. Gardner says true morality consists of
 "life-affirming, just, and compassionate behavior"(76). Few would dis-
 pute the desirability of such behavior, although many would and do
 debate how such terms as "justice" should be defined-and by whom-
 and not everyone would include "love of country" along with "hon-
 esty" and "moral courage" on a list of fundamental moral values (42).
 But, as Hume said of taste; few would dispute the general principles
 but many would dispute their application to particular cases (212-13).
 Although much of On Moral Fiction lays out Gardner's philosophical
 views on art, morality, truth, and beauty, a significant portion of it is
 devoted to illustrating his claim that our age is one of at best mediocre
 and at worst bad art, literature, music, philosophy, criticism. Tolstoy
 had made many of the same points about his age, and used Beethoven's
 Ninth Symphony and his own Anna Karenina as examples of such bad
 art. Gardner provides some examples of bad art that are less absurd but
 still highly debatable.
 Gardner argues that most contemporary writers of fiction either
 merely hold a mirror up to life with no effort to change it-and he cites
 Donald Barthelme as probably the best writer of this type (79-80)-or
 they advocate specific social justice goals that will cease to be meaning-
 ful once they are achieved. Gardner sees E. L. Doctorow as a writer of
 this second type, one who ignores the "permanently moral" while
 focusing on transitory social or political concerns. But Gardner uses as
 an example of such a "temporary" concern "social justice for particular
 minorities." Given the persistence of racism for centuries, it seems that
 working against racism is an integral part of a permanent moral concern
 with justice, rights, compassion, etc.-not a "dated and thus trivial"
 goal, as Gardner claims (77-78). Given that he sees racism as trivial and
 concern with "women's liberation" as propaganda (39), it may not be
 surprising that Gardner's pantheon of writers who express true moral
 values-and are therefore read and admired for many generations-
 consists of (mostly) dead white males: Dante, Chaucer, Shakespeare,
 Tolstoy, etc.
 Unlike these great writers of the past, most writers of the 1970's, and
 especially the postmodernists, are neither good nor true artists, accord-
 ing to Gardner. He argues that the work of Robert Coover and William
 Gass "will die quickly, of pure meanness." Most of the work of Thomas
 Ethics and Contemporary American Literature 45
 Pynchon and John Barth "will die of intellectual blight, academic nar-
 rowness, or fakery" (94).
 Gardner does suggest that in Chimera, Barth at least "comes through
 as a loving, optimistic man" even though the book is flawed by its
 "underestimation of women" and its author's "egoism." Gardner says
 that "an odd thing about Barth is that he always seems to know what's
 wrong with his fiction but never fixes it" (95). A piece like Barth's
 "Life-Story" illustrates this problem, Gardner says, as it self-reflexively
 comments on both the need for and the futility of trying to avoid endless
 self-reflexiveness (95-96). Yet, one could argue that this double gesture
 of both bemoaning and illustrating the inability to transcend one's own
 discourse, is just what the story is about-about the power and limits of
 fiction, language, and understanding. And an awareness of such power
 and limits seems integral to ethics, insofar as ethics concerns the
 subject's relation to the other.
 Gardner does allow that a few of his contemporaries are, indeed,
 moral writers. John Fowles is one of the few well-known recent writers
 of whom Gardner approves. Even though Fowles' work is often self-
 conscious, Fowles has convictions and so does his work, Gardner feels.
 Gardner also praises John Cheever, although not as fervently as he does
 Fowles, for caring about his characters and his readers, and for having
 an affirmative vision. Yet Updike, who explicitly addresses moral and
 religious concerns, is less successful, Gardner says, since he writes
 stories and novels that are "too much like sermons" and not enough
 like art, which, he says, must have "an essential and radical openness
 to persuasion" (99).
 Some writers have enormous talent but do not direct it toward the
 right ends, Gardner believes. William Gass, for instance, has the ability
 to create vivid characters, to "engage both the reader's emotion and
 intellect," but his work, in trying to "prove a theory" of language, winds
 up emptying everything out of his work but language (68). Gass and
 other postmodernists, who, Gardner claims, are concerned with lan-
 guage over all else or use literary language that is opaque, show a lack
 of concern for readers, as well as for morality. Such writers are "more
 in love, on principle, with the sound of words ... than with creating
 fictional worlds" (71). Gass, while "the best of [this] lot," is, nonetheless
 "stubbornly unreadable" (70).
 A more readable-perhaps even too readable-postmodernist fic-
 tion writer is Kurt Vonnegut, who, Gardner claims, has "moral energy"
 but is too world-weary and uncommitted to maintain it. Gardner criti-
 cizes Kurt Vonnegut for not caring "enough about his characters to use
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 them as anything but examples in a forced proof" (85). The characters
 exist as a vehicle for the novelist's message, not, Gardner says, "as
 subjects for the artist's open-minded exploration of what he can hon-
 estly say" (85).
 Gardner cites as an example of Vonnegut's cold-heartedness his
 frequent use of the phrase "so it goes" in Slaughterhouse Five, whenever
 a death (literal or metaphorical) occurs; Gardner is especially troubled
 by the use of the phrase in reference to the American fire-bombing of
 Dresden (87). Yet, I see Slaughterhouse Five as a critique of the passiv-
 ity-in the face of horror and death--exemplified by both its main
 character, Billy Pilgrim, and the Tralfamadorian space aliens Billy
 either visits or invents, whose saying this is.
 Writers, as Gardner often seems to forget, don't always advocate what
 they represent. Even though "so it goes" is said by Vonnegut's narrator
 (who seems to be a minimally fictionalized version of himself), this
 refrain may not reflect cynicism or cold-heartedness, but rather a cri-
 tique of these. Vonnegut has written in defense of Slaughterhouse Five
 after it had been burned in a North Dakota school furnace, that his
 works "beg that people be kinder and more responsible than they often
 are" (Palm Sunday, 6). Readers may argue about whether this goal is
 sincere or successfully achieved, but Gardner does not even consider
 the possibility that "so it goes" is used ironically or to achieve a moral
 effect.
 Gardner contrasts these immoral or amoral contemporary writers
 with the great canonical writers of the past-Homer, Sophocles, Virgil,
 Dante, Shakespeare, Melville--whose works persist because they are
 grounded in a moral vision. Such works, he says, "exert their civilizing
 influence century after century" (105). But Gardner believes that in our
 own century, because of the unhealthy influence of Nietzsche, Freud,
 Sartre, Wittgenstein, literary theory and criticism (from New Criticism
 through structuralism and poststructuralism), we have little art or
 literature that can celebrate life or lead us toward virtue. In part, this is
 because we live in an age of disbelief; for Gardner, it is difficult to take
 a properly moral view of art if one does not believe in God or at least
 in some non-theological foundation for moral values. Gardner is prob-
 ably right that "most [many?] contemporary writers are hesitant to
 speak of Truth and Beauty, not to mention God-hesitant to speak of
 the goodness of man, or the future of the world" (38). Many of us living
 in the postmodern age are less confident about the existence or meaning
 of these things than Gardner is, but that does not mean they have ceased
 to be concerns.10
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 For Gardner, the current climate of moral relativism and skepticism
 makes bad art inevitable, plentiful, and nearly victorious in its eternal
 struggle with good art (6). Gardner does not advocate outlawing or
 banning bad art, "since morality by compulsion is a fool's morality"
 (105-06). Instead he wants critics and artists to expose and reveal the
 badness of bad art and to discuss the need and criteria for good, moral
 art-as he is doing in this book. Gardner is issuing a call for writers to
 rethink the goals of their work and for critics to consider not only
 aesthetic, linguistic, or political aspects of literary works but also, and
 most importantly, their ethical dimension.
 One can invoke the good, the true, the beautiful even in a largely
 secular world, Gardner argues. Art, he believes, should convey the
 good, the true, and the beautiful, even though these are not "things that
 exist in the way llamas do, but values which exist when embodied, and,
 furthermore, recognized as embodied" (133).
 One of the more valuable parts of Gardner's argument is his claim
 that these values are neither absolute nor relative. Instead, they are
 what he calls "relative absolute values," a phrase which seems oxy-
 moronic but is not. This notion is one that I found intriguing when I
 first read the book a decade ago and still find useful today.
 Gardner's notion of "relative absolutes" is, I would argue, not so
 unlike the concept used by a far trendier (and smarter) theorist, Judith
 Butler: "contingent foundations." For Butler, traditional (non-contin-
 gent) foundations (such as theological or philosophical grounds for
 moral value claims) "function as the unquestioned and the unquestion-
 able within any theory." Yet, even from her deconstructive perspective,
 "the point is not to do away with foundations, or even to champion a
 position that goes under the name of anti-foundationalism," but rather
 to "expose the foundational premise as a contingent and contestable
 presumption" (7). Elsewhere, I have used the term "good enough"
 foundations (borrowing D. W. Winnicott's term for mothers) to suggest
 that there may be foundational claims, especially for ethics, that are
 always subject to scrutiny and even revision, but can still serve as
 grounds for action. Such a "good enough" foundation for ethical prac-
 tice might include a "belief in love or justice as goods even if their status
 as goods cannot be philosophically demonstrated beyond a shadow of
 a doubt" (Edelstein, 14). For Gardner, the relativity of "relative abso-
 lutes" is in relation to all of human history--someday, other absolutes
 could prevail. But many of us see such relativity (or the contingency of
 foundations) as a function of space as well as time-reflecting the
 positions, the cultures, and the identities in which we dwell.
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 Gardner doesn't despair that good, true, beautiful, and moral art is
 possible in the world we now inhabit. He cites some contemporary
 writers-John Fowles, Grace Paley, Charles Johnson and others-who
 do seem to search for truth-and Toni Morrison, for whom love is
 central." But, Gardner argues, if, under the influence of postmodern-
 ism, most writers continue to foreground language, texture, structure,
 while backgrounding plot and especially character, and if critics con-
 tinue to praise these writers, then literature will fail to achieve its
 potential as a moral force.
 Even though Gardner seems to hold a basically mimetic view of
 literature, for him, as for Aristotle and Sidney, literature need not show
 how things are but "how things ought to be" (Gardner, 16). It should
 ask moral questions, even if moral answers aren't always available.
 Gardner believes that the "present scarcity of first-rate art does not
 follow from a sickness of society but the other way around-unless,
 possibly, the two chase each other's tails." The mutually influential
 relationship between the arts and society is certainly more complex
 than Gardner's metaphor suggests. For Gardner, though, artists seem
 to have a sacred duty to heal society-and it is his duty to remind other
 artists of this obligation.
 Gardner is "convinced that, once the alarm has been sounded, good
 art easily beats out bad" (126), and his book is supposed to be this
 wake-up call. And, indeed, since On Moral Fiction appeared, there has
 been renewed attention to ethics in/and literature and critical theory.
 In the last ten years, we have seen the publication of books such as
 Wayne Booth's The Company We Keep: The Ethics of Fiction, Tobin Siebers'
 The Ethics of Criticism, J. Hillis Miller's The Ethics of Reading, and David
 Parker's Ethics, Theory, and The Novel.'2 Gardner may have anticipated
 this important renewal of interest in ethics even if, in 1978, he was a
 lone voice crying in the wilderness (as I think he perceived himself).
 Yet, his book is substantially different from these later ones in that his
 seeks to prescribe how creative writers themselves should write; even
 when these more recent books are being prescriptive rather than de-
 scriptive, their primary audience is readers and critics, who are accus-
 tomed to arguing about how one should read. Perhaps because of both
 its tone and its timing, On Moral Fiction has not played a significant role
 in recent theoretical discussions of literature and ethics, even though it
 has some valuable ideas to contribute to such discussions.
 Perhaps Gardner's book was widely decried and has since been
 largely ignored not only because of his harsh judgments of his peers
 and his era, but because of his limited vision of what moral fiction is.
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 There are more ways for a novel or story to be moral, to have moral
 effects, than Gardner considers. Jonathan Baumbach, in his critique of
 Gardner, suggests that "the job of moral fiction ... is to make large
 demands on the reader, to create experiences that trouble his most
 cherished preconceptions, that allow him no easy gratifications, that
 extend his intelligence and enlarge his capacity to feel" ("A Writers'
 Forum," 6). Many contemporary works (e.g., Lolita, Beloved) raise ethi-
 cal questions even if they don't provide definitive answers, and encour-
 aging readers to ponder ethical issues can itself have an ethical effect.
 Postmodern fiction can, even through its language and form, also have
 ethical effects. Self-reflexive fiction can encourage readers to think
 deeply about reality, subjectivity, and alterity; even deeply textured
 work like Nabokov's or Gass's can defamiliarize language and percep-
 tion and thus make us more fully aware of ourselves and of the world.
 Works that deal with gender or race need not be "propaganda," as
 Gardner thinks they are, but can-through plot, character, style---en-
 gage, as Gardner thinks all moral fiction should, "universal" concerns
 (love, kinship, death). But many recent writers also manage to retain
 and celebrate particularity, historical specificity, and thus avoid the
 effacement of difference, the mistaken identification of the particular
 (e.g., maleness, whiteness) with the universal. Through exploring both
 difference and commonality, many contemporary writers can provide
 a new vision of ethics based on respect for the other (and the otherness
 of the other). Many contemporary writers may share Shelley's view of
 how literature can be moral-by developing the imagination and thus
 the capacity for empathy and love. I think of recent novels like Barbara
 Kingsolver's The Bean Trees and see that life-affirming, aesthetically
 successful (and also politically engaged) fiction is possible and that
 there is an appreciative audience for it-even if some of us also value
 Barth or Barthelme.
 Gardner's philosophical analyses of goodness, truth, beauty, and
 morality may be imperfect. Gardner may rely on pre-postmodern as-
 sumptions-universality, essentialism, and foundationalism-rather
 than trying to engage seriously and then refute postmodern critiques
 of these. But we don't need to throw Gardner's baby (concern with
 ethics) out with the bathwater (the polemics, diatribes, and flawed
 judgments in On Moral Fiction). Nor do postmodernists need to throw
 the baby (ethics) out with the (Enlightenment) bathwater. Even
 postmodernists might embrace, in daily life if not in theoretical trea-
 tises, Gardner's notion of morality as "doing what is unselfish, helpful,
 kind, and noble-hearted" (23).
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 Who among us doesn't want the world to be better? Why shouldn't
 literature have a role to play in helping us move toward this better
 world? For Gardner, art has an obligation to affirm life, to convey the
 good, true, and beautiful because "it is civilization's single most signif-
 icant device for learning what must be affirmed and what must be
 denied" (146). Like Plato, Gardner believes literature has enormous
 power; unlike Plato, Gardner argues that this power can be used for
 good. It may be self-delusion to believe in literature's power in an age
 when television, video, cinema, and CD-ROM's have much larger
 audiences than do works of literature. But if so, it is a widespread
 delusion among those of us who devote our lives to literary study
 and/or creation.
 On Moral Fiction may have been overly gloomy about the state of
 contemporary arts and theory. It may also have been nostalgic for a lost
 golden age of moral fiction and moral criticism. Yet, paradoxically,
 perhaps it was 'also ahead of its time. The "high" postmodernism
 Gardner decried--that of Barth and Barthelme, endlessly self-reflexive,
 ironic, playful-has been supplemented if not supplanted by a
 postmodern "literature of replenishment" (Barth) that is more politi-
 cally and socially engaged but still innovative (e.g., the work of Maxine
 Hong Kingston, Toni Morrison, or Sandra Cisneros in the U.S. or the
 work of Milan Kundera, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Angela Carter
 abroad). Gardner's own ethical gesture may have been publishing a
 book that, because of or in spite of the widespread negative reactions
 to it, helped to revive interest in the intersections between literature and
 ethics, word and world.
 Notes
 1. Gardner had been working on the book slowly for many years, even before he
 became known as a novelist. Several sections of it had been published already--one
 even in Critical Inquiry in 1977.
 2. Frederick Exley's judgment there was the most damning and the most suc-
 cinct: "John Gardner is full of shit" ("A Writers' Forum," 10).
 3. For an overview of critical reactions to On Moral Fiction, see Cowart (15-19),
 who describes them as "a chorus of denunciation" filled with "contumely from the
 parties judged, anger and near hysteria on the part of their apologists" (17, 15). See
 also MacCurdy, who provides both an analysis of critical reaction and a history of
 Gardner's work on the subject of moral fiction. MacCurdy suggests that On Moral
 Fiction "colored everything Gardner published afterwards, as well as the critics'
 responses to it"; reviewers often criticized his later work "either for being too
 didactic ..., or for not following his critical theory" (136, 139).
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 4. Clausen notes that "discussions of literature and ethics make most contempo-
 rary critics squirm in their chairs. The largely dismissive response that greeted John
 Gardner's On Moral Fiction when it came out in 1978 was a notable example of this
 unease" (1).
 5. Gardner briefly responds to Kant's argument for the disinterestedness of
 judgments of beauty by claiming that "art ... is not independent of all interest but
 beyond all interest" (162).
 6. Yet, Vladimir Nabokov claims that even Oscar Wilde, an exemplary aesthetic-
 ist, was among those who "were in reality rank moralists and didacticists" (Strong
 Opinions 33).
 7. Some, especially recent, poststructuralist literary theory and criticism does
 engage ethical issues, even though such work does not ask the same questions nor
 arrive at the same conclusions that Gardner does. See, for example, Miller's The Ethics
 of Reading. Cf. Harpham, esp. 387-94.
 8. See, for example, Nabokov's assertion that he "has no social purpose, no moral
 message;... I just like composing riddles with elegant solutions" (Strong Opinions,
 16). This is a view he reiterates in many of his infamous forewords, and in the
 Afterword to Lolita, in which he contrasts his own views with those of "John Ray,
 Jr.," the "editor" he created for Lolita. Ray praises the book's "ethical impact" and
 "general lesson" (7); in the Afterword, Nabokov argues that, "despite John Ray's
 assertion, Lolita has no moral in tow" (316). Palmer suggests that Gardner's book is
 a "defense of the tradition for which John Ray is an ironic spokesman" (162); Gardner
 himself criticizes Nabokov for being concerned with "aesthetic bliss" over all else.
 Yet, Nabokov's views of the relation between ethics and aesthetics are more complex
 than they might appear. For instance, in his Lectures on Literature, Nabokov claims
 that "a major writer combines these three--storyteller, teacher, enchanter" (5), and
 elsewhere he accurately prophesied that future critics would find him "a rigid
 moralist kicking sin, cuffing stupidity ... and assigning sovereign power to tender-
 ness, talent, and pride" (Strong Opinions 193).
 9. Of course, one could easily turn Gardner's ethical standards back upon this
 book itself. Written by someone who advocates love, kindness, and respect for
 others, this is often a remarkably ill-tempered, judgmental, and dogmatic book (even
 though at times it is also impassioned, eloquent, and wise). In one rather over-
 wrought passage, Gardner criticizes "our schools thrown up like barricades in the
 way of young minds, our brainless fat religions, our ritual of fornicating with all
 pretty or even horse-faced strangers" [unless "we" are women]; he claims that we
 "praise debauchery as pluralism" (100).
 10. And many of us would want to expand one of these concerns to "the goodness
 of men and women" or "the goodness of human beings." This common problem-using
 the male as generic but also as normative and universal-suggests some of the
 reasons why contemporary theorists, especially feminists, have been skeptical of
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 traditional ethics, with its universal subject and universal principles. See Harpham
 for a brief overview of such critiques (387-89).
 11. Morrison and Johnson are among the very few writers of color Gardner even
 mentions (and Morrison and Paley are among the very few women); perhaps
 Gardner praised Johnson not so much because he is a fine writer but because Johnson
 had been his student. (Thanks to Aldon Nielsen for pointing this out to me.)
 12. As Steven Connor points out, Parker's book "opens with a rhetorical gesture
 that has become conventional in the new literary ethics, by claiming to be breaking
 an almost total silence about ethical matters in literary theory. At the same time, and
 with unconscious irony, he points to and associates himself with the veritable
 clamour of other critical voices calling for a return to ethical thinking," such as Booth
 (25). Booth is the only one of these critics to discuss Gardner's book, although only
 briefly. Booth argues that Gardner's ideas about how fiction can be moral or have
 ethical effects are limited and that his suggested method for evaluating moral fiction
 is simplistic and reductive.
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